by Alan Hart
In retrospect it can be seen that the 1967 war, the Six Days War, was the
turning point in the relationship between the Zionist state of Israel and
the Jews of the world . . .
So how and why did the 1967 war transform the relationship between the Jews
of the world and Israel?
. . . the intensity of the pride most Jews of the world experienced with
Israel’s military victory was in large part a product of the intensity
of the fear that came before it. In the three weeks before the war, the Jews
of the world truly believed, because (like Israeli Jews) they were
conditioned by Zionism to believe, that the Arabs were poised to attack and
that Israel’s very existence was at stake and much in doubt.
The Jews of the world (and Israeli Jews) could not be blamed for
believing that, but it was a big, fat propaganda lie.
Though Egypt’s President Nasser had asked UNEF forces to withdraw, had
closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping and had reinforced his army
in the Sinai, neither his Egypt nor any of the frontline Arab states
had any intention of attacking Israel. And Israel’s leaders, and the
Johnson administration, knew that.
In short, and as I detail and document in my book Zionism: The Real
Enemy of the Jews, the offensive Israel launched at 0750 hours (local
time) on Monday 5 June was not a pre-emptive strike or an act of
self-defence. It was a war of aggression.
On this 45th anniversary of the start of the Six Days War, here is a
reminder of what they said.
In an interview published in Le Monde on 28 February 1968, Israeli Chief of
Staff Rabin said this: "I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two
divisions which he sent into Sinai on 14 May would not have been enough to
unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it."
On 14 April 1971, a report in the Israeli newspaper Al-Hamishmar contained
the following statement by Mordecai Bentov, a member of the wartime national
government. "The entire story of the danger of extermination was invented in
every detail and exaggerated a posteriori to justify the annexation of new
On 4 April 1972, General Haim Bar-Lev, Rabin's predecessor as chief of
staff, was quoted in Ma'ariv as follows: "We were not threatened with
genocide on the eve of the Six Days War, and we had never thought of such a
In the same Israeli newspaper on the same day, General Ezer Weizmann, Chief
of Operations during the war and a nephew of Chaim Weizmann, was quoted as
saying: "There was never any danger of annihilation. This hypothesis has
never been considered in any serious meeting."
In the spring of 1972, General Matetiyahu Peled, Chief of Logistical Command
during the war and one of 12 members of Israel's General Staff, addressed a
political literary club in Tel Aviv. He said: "The thesis according to which
the danger of genocide hung over us in June 1967, and according to which
Israel was fighting for her very physical survival, was nothing but a bluff
which was born and bred after the war."
In a radio debate Peled also said: "Israel was never in real danger and
there was no evidence that Egypt had any intention of attacking Israel." He
added that "Israeli intelligence knew that Egypt was not prepared for war."
In the same programme General Chaim Herzog (former Director of Military
Intelligence, future Israeli Ambassador to the UN and President of his
state) said: "There was no danger of annihilation. Neither Israeli
headquarters nor the Pentagon - as the memoirs of President Johnson proved -
believed in this danger."
On 3 June 1972 Peled was even more explicit in an article of his own for Le
Monde. He wrote: "All those stories about the huge danger we were facing
because of our small territorial size, an argument expounded once the war
was over, have never been considered in our calculations. While we proceeded
towards the full mobilisation of our forces, no person in his right mind
could believe that all this force was necessary to our 'defence' against the
Egyptian threat. This force was to crush once and for all the Egyptians at
the military level and their Soviet masters at the political level. To
pretend that the Egyptian forces concentrated on our borders were capable of
threatening Israel's existence does not only insult the intelligence of any
person capable of analysing this kind of situation, but is primarily an
insult to the Israeli army. . . .
Simon Tisdall, "Ahmadinejad on
Israel: Global Danger or Political Infighting?," Guardian, December
Stephen Lendman, "Forty Years Of
Israeli Occupation," sjlendman.blogspot.com, May 23, 2007
Uri Avnery, "The War of
Lies: Israel's First War on Lebanon," sjlendman.blogspot.com, May